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GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: THE JUSTICES AND CONNECTI-
CUT'S "UNCOMMONLY SILLY LAW"
Ernest Katin*
The lawyers will be arguing about this one for a long time. Not since
Justice Holmes upheld the right of sterilization, on the ground that two




Griswold v. Connecticut,2 which held unconstitutional the Connecticut
birth control statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples,
is pregnant with legal significance for the development of constitutional law,
the study of judicial behavior, and the function of legal institutions.
After having previously evaded the constitutional issue on jurisdictional
grounds,' in 1965 the United States Supreme Court finally confronted the merits
of the controversy. The difficulties the justices encountered in deciding the
case were manifested by the number of opinions they wrote. Although Mr.
Justice Douglas's opinion is designated as "the opinion of the Court," Mr.
Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion in which he was joined by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, while Justices Harlan and White each
wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment, and Justices Black and
Stewart each handed down dissenting opinions.
The case culminated a bitter, forty-five-year legislative struggle to elim-
inate Connecticut's birth control statute,5 which, unlike similar statutes in other
states,' forbade the use of any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception and assisting or counseling anyone to commit
such offense. Because the state legislature had consistently frustrated all efforts
Member, Minnesota Bar; B.A., University of Minnesota, 1952; LL.B., University of
Minnesota Law School, 1958; Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1962; former Assistant Pro-
fessor of Political Science, Illinois Teacher's College.
1 Washington: Brother Douglas, Brother Black, 0 Brother! N.Y. Times, June 9, 1965,
p. 46, col. 6 (late city ed.).
2 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
4 Cogley, Controversy in Connecticut, 67 COMMONWEAL 657 (1958); Comment, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 275 (1964). The Connecticut statute was enacted in 1873, but efforts for
repeal had been pursued in the legislature continuously since 1923. Comment, 70 YALE L.J.
322 (1960).
5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1960). Section 53-32 provides:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Section 54-196 provides:
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit
any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.
6 Brief for Appellants, p. 24, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Com-
ment, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275 (1964). Some abortion laws could have a similar effect with
regard to certain types of contraception. Meloy, Pre-Implementation Fertility Control and
the Abortion Laws, 41 CHI.-KENT L. RaV. 183 (1964).
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to repeal or amend the statute and the Connecticut courts had strictly interpreted
its provisions," opponents of the statute regarded an attack on its constitutionality
as the only recourse. In 1961 the Supreme Court, in denying jurisdiction in
a declaratory judgment action, held that the law had been nullified through
nonenforcement.' The Planned Parenthood League proceeded on this assump-
tion to open a New Haven birth control clinic, which gave information, instruc-
tion, and medical advice on the means for preventing conception. Following
a complaint filed by a private citizen, Connecticut authorities raided the clinic,
and the executive director and attending physician were later found guilty of
violating the statute and fined one hundred dollars each.' After their convic-
tions were upheld by the courts of Connecticut, the defendants petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, contending that the statute denied them their
liberty and property under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
denied them their freedom of speech under the first arid fourteenth amendments,
and constituted an unreasonable and unjustifiable invasion of their privacy
contrary to the fourth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments."0
Since the justices agreed that no specific provision of the Bill of Rights
was applicable, the Court was compelled to wrestle with the question of whether
an unenumerated constitutional right was violated. A majority of the justices
had held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment "absorbed"
or "incorporated" various guarantees of the first eight amendments,"" but that
it did not confer any independent substantive rights.12 Therefore, the justices
had to determine whether a right was violated that could be encompassed within
one or more of the enumerated rights or whether the Constitution confers rights
that are not enumerated.
This article evaluates the judicial opinions, considers other constitutional
arguments not considered in the opinions, discusses the future implications of
this decision, and notes its significance in the current debate regarding legisla-
tion affecting public morals.
II. The Opinions
A. Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Douglas, in presenting the opinion of the Court, first dis-
posed of the question of standing' and then insisted that the Court
does not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
7 Comment, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275, 287-88 '(1964).
8 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501-03 (1961).
9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
10 Brief for Appellants, pp. 11-13.
11 E.g., Griffn v. California 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 728 (1963); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co.,
336 U.S. 220 '(1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Gossert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Olson v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n,
313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
13 Douglas, in finding that the defendants had standing to assert the constitutional rights
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propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation
of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that
relation. 14
This view accords with his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 5 where he supported the
need for social experimentation but contended that
to say that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee
of the Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to
override specific guarantees so long as what it does fails to shock the
sensibilities of a majority of the Court.'6
In that opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas distinguished the economic regulation of
the sale or distribution of contraceptives from the personal regulation of the use
of contraceptives; and he contended that the error of the Court in the era when
it struck down social legislation lay not in inquiring into constitutionality, but
in applying its own standard of reasonableness to questions that touched no
particular provisions of the Constitution.'
In Poe Douglas derived a right to privacy from the "totality of the con-
stitutional scheme"; and he read the right into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, contending that this clause included the first eight
amendments, but was not restricted to them. In Griswold, however, he con-
tended that a constitutional right of privacy exists, which is derived from
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights [which] have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance....
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained
in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house"
in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that pri-
vacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." . . . The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.""'
Douglas noted that the Court had a number of controversies regarding
these penumbral rights of "privacy and repose." " The Connecticut statute,
of the married couples with whom they had a professional relationship, noted that they had
been convicted for serving married couples in violation of an aiding and abetting statute,
as distinguished from the more strict requirements of representing others in a declaratory
judgment action. The accessory is deemed to have standing to assert that the offense that
he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime. The rights of
husband and wife were likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless considered in a suit
involving the defendants, who had the confidential relation here involved. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14 Id. at 482.
15 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
16 Id. at 518.
17 Id. at 519-21.
18 Id. at 484.
19 Ibid., citing Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343




by prohibiting the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their sale or
manufacture, invaded a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. The evil of the statute was
that it sought to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
impact on private human relationships. In striking down the law, Douglas
invoked the principle that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activi-
ties constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
' 20
In mentioning the enumerated rights from which he derived the right
of privacy, Douglas concluded by quoting the ninth amendment but did not
explicitly state its relevance. His reference to the marriage relationship and
its antiquity suggests notions of "rights retained by the people."21 In his sub-
sequent dissenting opinion in Osborn v. United States22 in referring to Griswold,
he again alluded to the ninth amendment, quoting a student note on point:
The ninth amendment should be permitted to occupy its rightful
place in the Constitution as a reminder at the end of the Bill of Rights
that there exist rights other than those set out in the first eight amendments.
It was intended to preserve the underlying theory of the Constitutional
Convention that individual rights exist independently of government, and
to negate the Federalist argument that the enumeration of certain rights
would imply the forfeiture of all others. The ninth is simply a rule of
construction, applicable to the entire constitution.23
Douglas apparently holds that although the right of privacy may be induced
from the enumerated rights, it exists independently by virtue of the ninth
amendment. The role that the fourteenth amendment assumed in the Poe
dissent is now assumed by the ninth. But Douglas has now attempted to be
more explicit in inducing the right of privacy from the rights specified in the
first eight 'amendments.
The precedents Douglas used to establish a "penumbral" right of privacy
.involved fact situations where actual, enumerated rights were infringed and a
finding of "penumbral" rights was not necessary. For example, the right of
association, which Douglas referred to as a facet of the right of privacy within
the penumbra of the first amendment, is actually an aspect of free speech. When
an individual who expresses, or becomes identified with the expression of,
certain utterances is compelled to endure retribution by public exposure or
discharge from employment, his speech is abridged.2 4 Similarly, the precedents
20 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 '(1965).
21 Id. at 485-86.
22 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
23 Id. at 352 n.15,referring to Comment, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 814, 835 (1966).
24 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 '(1952). Some of
these cases may be regarded as involving procedural rights in making a determination whether
an individual may retain employment. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
The issue of statutory vagueness is also involved. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). Or the sanction may constitute
a bill of attainder. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). The cases are discussed
[Vol. 42:680]
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involving the fourth and fifth amendments where the Court alluded to a
right of privacy actually involved search or seizure or self-incrimination.2 5 Mr.
Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States" referred
to an infringement of privacy through wire tapping," which was related to a
"constructive" search and seizure;2 8 but no search and seizure whatever was
involved in Griswold.
Douglas's opinion in Griswold may have differed from his dissent in Poe
because he was writing an "opinion of the Court," in which he attempted,
though unsuccessfully, to achieve a majority consensus. Some of the justices
would not agree that the fourteenth amendment could be used to confer other
rights as well as to incorporate the first eight amendments.29 Also, by attempting
to rely as much as possible on specific constitutional provisions and the ninth
amendment, Douglas may have attempted to meet the dissenters' objection that
the Court assumed the role of a super-legislature. A general right of privacy
that the court can apply at its discretion by virtue of the ninth amendment,
however, bears implications similar to substantive due process.
Another significant departure from his Poe dissent was Douglas's failure to
claim a first amendment infringement. In Poe Douglas contended that the
Connecticut statute, as applied to the physician, constituted an abridgement
of free speech because he was prevented from disseminating information on
birth control. Douglas might have decided not to invoke the first amendment
in Griswold because the physician, by prescribing birth control methods, was
engaged in action and not merely in the exercise of speech3 0 The entire con-
duct of the appellants, in organizing the clinic and in violating the law, involved
activities encompassing more than the mere utterance or conveyance of infor-
mation.3
The appellants, however, argued that by abridging the freedom to prac-
tice medicine, the statute impeded the pursuit of experimentation and investi-
gation, involving elements of free speech, and that it was difficult to draw the
line between speech and action. The brief argued that this action was similar
generally in KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT '(1965); Emerson, Freedom
of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
25 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
27 Id. at 473, 478.
28 People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
29 Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People"? 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
787, 794-95 (1962).
30 A confusing element is Mr. Justice Black's statement in dissent that "my disagreement
with the Court's opinion [Douglas] . . . here is a narrow one, relating to the application of
the First Amendment to the facts and circumstances of this case. But my disagreement with
brothers Harlan, White and Goldberg is more basice' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
511 (1965). Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcE. L. REv. 235 (1965), suggests Douglas may have
derived the right of privacy from first amendment freedoms, although conceding this is
not apparent. However, Douglas clearly does not regard the Connecticut statute as denying
free speech, the position he had taken in Poe.
31 In a footnote to his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
If all the appellants bad done was to advise people that they thought the use of
contraceptives was desirable, or even counsel their use, the appellants would, of
course, have a substantial First Amendment claim. But their activities went far
beyond mere advocacy. They prescribed specific contraceptive devices and furnished
patients with the prescribe contraceptive materials. 381 U.S. 479, 529 n.3 (1965).
[June 1967]
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to expression in that the pursuit of scientific knowledge involves the same values
and includes the facilitation of social change by means not harmful to others.1
2
Professor Emerson, who wrote the brief and presented this argument, later
admitted that this rationale was weak." One commentator has argued that
first amendment rights may have been infringed in that the denial to married
couples of access to birth control information constituted an abridgement of
the exercise of free speech. 4 Only a few weeks earlier, however, the Court had
rejected a somewhat similar rationale for invoking the first amendment in
relation to the freedom to travel as curtailed by the refusal to issue passports. 3
Furthermore, to apply the first amendment in Griswold probably would have
adversely affected the state's authority to regulate the practice of medicine.
B. Mr. Justice Goldberg
In an opinion concurred in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan,
Mr. Justice Goldberg agreed with Mr. Justice Douglas but was more explicit
in relying on the ninth amendment. His view was that, by virtue of the ninth
amendment, the Court is not limited by the rights specified in the first eight
amendments in upholding fundamental rights against both federal and state
authority. The -Court must determine what rights are fundamental by referring
to the constitutional scheme and the collective conscience of the people. One
such fundamental right is the right of privacy in marriage, which was encroached
by the Connecticut birth control statute. The ban on the usfe of contraceptives
by married persons cannot be justified as serving any compelling state interest.
Goldberg's approach in applying the ninth amendment has been charac-
terized as a philosophically idealist conception, reminiscent of Savigny's anti-
natural law Volksgeist theory of the law as the revelation of the spirit of the
Volk. In contrast, the contention is made that Douglas applied a legal method
that is opposed to arbitrariness because it is grounded in analogy justified by
the texts of the first eight amendments. While Goldberg's legal method was
secretive and subjective, Douglas applied the Roman Law method of closing
gaps in constitutionally protected rights by use of analogy in developing the
force of the first eight amendments and other constitutional provisions to con-
trol and determine novel legal problems3
Regardless of the methodology, however, the subjective role of the judge
cannot be ignored. Whether a right of privacy is derived from the enumerated
rights or from notions of Volksgeist, there must be an appeal to the underlying
values of the first eight amendments, and such appeal involves a subjective
determination. Moreover, the concept of a right of privacy is of such breadth
that, once constitutionally established, it can be made to encompass whatever
the judge may choose.
32 Brief for Appellants, pp. 67-69.
33 Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Micir. L. Rv. 219, 221 (1965).
34 Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy? 64 Mcn. L. Rnv. 197 (1965).
35 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
36 Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method -and Its Implications for Re-
publican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40
TULANE L. Rav. 487, 489 (1966).
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The use of the ninth amendment in this case is a novel development, for
it has been generally ignored by the Court, lawyers and scholars.3 7 Writers
have supported a broader application than is indicated in Goldberg's opinion,
contending that the amendment was originally intended to apply to the states
as well as the federal government. Its wording, the enumerated rights are
"retained by the people," suggests a limitation upon the states when read with
the tenth amendment's reservation of power "to the states respectively or to
the people"; the theory is that the ninth amendment suggests a limitation upon
the tenth. 8 When originally proposed, the two amendments were in one article
and later separated.' 9 Chief Justice Marshall, in Barron v. Baltimore," did not
specifically hold the ninth amendment inapplicable to the states, referring only
to the "Bill of Rights." Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Palko v. Connecticut,"' stated
that the first eight amendments are not incorporated into the fourteenth. The
implication from these cases is that the ninth amendment may be an independent
source for asserting rights not mentioned elsewhere in the Constitution.
Goldberg may have limited the scope of the ninth amendment merely to
broadening the use of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
partly to answer Justice Black's objection that its use would make the Court
a "day-to-day constitutional convention."'" Moreover, Goldberg's approach
accords with previous Supreme Court practice, whereas the approach of the
commentators would constitute a radical break. Apparently Goldberg felt he
could not rely solely on the fourteenth amendment, because the Court had
denuded its substantive content by deferring to the legislature the determination
of the reasonableness of regulatory legislation4 ' and by tending to limit the
application of the due process clause to the incorporation or absorption of the
specific rights of the first eight amendments." By coupling the ninth amendment
to the fourteenth, Goldberg apparently attempted to revive some of the latter's
substantive content and invoke the precedents upholding the right of family
privacy.
According to Goldberg and Douglas, the states are free to engage in social
experimentation and regulation as long as fundamental personal rights are
not infringed. Of course, all regulation affects personal freedom, and the com-
plexity of industrial society requires the Court to allow governmental authori-
ties the widest discretion in economic regulation and experimentation.4 '
Many economic and social matters involve an expertise the Court may lack,
37 PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 2 (1955); Redlich, Are There
"Certain Rights ... Retained by the People"? 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962).
38 PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTi AMENDMENT (1955); Redlich, supra note 37, at
807.
39 Redlich, supra note 37.
40 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 '(1833).
41 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Mr. Justice Miller stated for the first time that only the first
eight amendments to the Constitution had reference to the powers exercised by the Govern-
ment of the United States and not to the states. Eilenbecher v. District Ct. Plymouth County,
134 U.S. 31 (1890).
42 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965).
43 See note 12 supra.
44 See note 11 supra.
45 Moynihan, Behind Los Angeles: Jobless Negroes and the Boom, Reporter, Sept. 9,
Oct. 7, 1965; The Moynihan Report, Christ. Century, Dec. 15, 1965, p. 1531; Langer, Birth




and in these cases it should defer to administrative discretion and the wisdom
of the legislature. However, when basic human relationships are involved, the
Court will feel compelled to protect individual rights. Questions of privacy may
touch vital issues of justice and public order that cannot be answered by mere
verbal definitions, but call for the Court's delicate judgment.
C. Mr. Justice Harlan
Mr. Justice Harlan contended, as did Justices Douglas and Goldberg, that
the Connecticut statute encroached upon the privacy of the marital relation-
ship, but he invoked the fourteenth amendment, which to him, however, does
not incorporate or absorb the specific provisions of the first eight amendments.
For him, the proper constitutional inquiry "is whether this Connecticut statute
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "46
While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to the provisions of the Bill
of Rights, "it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its
own bottom."4 ' Disagreeing with the dissenters, Harlan contended that reliance
upon the specific provisions of the Constitution rather than the due process
clause will not achieve judicial restraint by precluding personal interpretations.
Harlan referred to his dissent in Poe for further elaboration of his position.
There he argued that the state intruded upon the most intimate details of the
marital relationslip with the full power of the criminal law and that the statute
"allows the State to inquire into, prove and punish married people for the
private use of their marital intimacy.""8 He argued that this violated the fourth
amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth.
It would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing substance to
form were it to be held that the Constitutional principle of privacy against
arbitrary official intrusion comprehends only physical invasion by the
police. To be sure, the times presented the Framers with two particular
threats to that principle, the general warrant .. .and the quartering of
soldiers in private homes. But though "Legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, is enacted, ... from an experience of evils, ... its general
language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that
evil had theretofore taken .... [A] principle to be vital must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.... "
Although the form of intrusion here -the enactment of a substantive
offense -does not, in my opinion, preclude the making of a claim based
on the right of privacy embraced in the "liberty" of the Due Process
Clause, it must be acknowledged that there is another sense in which it
could be argued that this intrusion on privacy differs from what the Fourth
Amendment, and the similar concept of the Fourteenth, were intended to
protect: here we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on the
life which characteristically has its place in the home. But to my mind
such a distinction is so insubstantial as to be captious: if the physical
curtilage of the home is protected, it is surely as a result of solicitude to
46 381 U.S. 498, 500 (1965).
47 Ibid.
48 367 U.S. 497, 548 '(1961).
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protect the privacies of the life within. Certainly the safeguarding of the
home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property lights. The
home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.49
In contrast to the approaches of Douglas and Goldberg, Harlan's does
not require the use of the ninth amendment or the "penumbras" of enumerated
rights. His position indicates that, although the incorporation doctrine may be
identified with those seeking more zealously to protect individual rights, cases
may arise where this approach is limited and the Frankfurter-Harlan approach
can prove more useful.
D. Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice White said that although the Court will defer to legislative
discretion in matters involving economic regulation, statutes encroaching upon
certain sensitive areas are subject to judicial scrutiny under the due process
or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.5" These areas, as
indicated by the precedents cited in the opinion, include the family,51 freedom
of speech52 and association,5" the right to travel5 4 and to engage in a profession,55
and classifications based on racial distinctions.5 But even where a statute en-
croaches in these areas, it will be deemed constitutional where it can be justified
as "reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial
state interest and not arbitrary or capricious in application. ' 'z? The Connecticut
ban on the use of contraceptives by married persons did not meet these con-
ditions, because it was not shown to be "reasonably necessary for the effectuation
of a legitimate and substantial state interest"; further, the opinion hints, the
law was "arbitrary or capricious in application," because its most serious use had
been against birth control clinics rendering advice to married rather than un-
married couples."
However, this approach contradicts White's dissent in Robinson v. Cali-
fornia,59 where the Court held the conviction of a narcotics addict constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. 0 In that dissent,
he noted the "present Court's allergy to substantive due process" in economic
matters, and failed "to see why the Court deems it more appropriate to write
into the Constitution its own abstract notions on how best to handle the nar-
cotics problem, for it obviously cannot match either the States or Congress in
expert understanding."'" It would seem, however, that in family matters as well,
the Court cannot "exceed the States or Congress in expert understanding," and
49 Id. at 551.
50 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (concurring opinion).
51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
52 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
53 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
54 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
55 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
56 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
57 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (concurring opinion).
58 Id. at 506.
59 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
60 Id. at 666-67.
61 Id. at 689.
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the same may be said about the other "sensitive" areas. Justice White's view of
the due process clause is especially subject to challenge, because he does not
invoke the first eight amendments to contend that certain matters should be
subject to judicial scrutiny within the concept of due process as encroachments
upon enumerated rights or their underlying values as differentiated from eco-
nomic relations.
E. The Dissenting Opinions
Justices Stewart and Black, while deeming the Connecticut statute an
"uncommonly silly ' 62 and "offensive"' 3 law, filed vigorous dissenting opinions,
asserting that the Court had no authority to invalidate the Connecticut law.
Differing with Douglas, they found no constitutional right of privacy created
by the first eight amendments. They did not construe the ninth amendment
as empowering the Court to uphold rights not specified in the first eight amend-
ments, but regarded it like the tenth, as a mere "truism" reaffirming that the
federal government has only limited powers. To hold otherwise, they con-
tended, would be to "play somersaults with history"6 and would greatly
broaden the power of the judiciary by making the Court "a day-to-day con-
stitutional convention."6 The dissenters also objected to the substantive due
process approach of Harlan and White, contending that the Court had wisely
abandoned this approach by deferring to legislative determination and refusing
to sit as a supervisory agency over a duly constituted legislative body.
Black would limit the fourteenth amendment due process clause to the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights and limit the Court to the interpretation
of specific constitutional provisions. However, in tracing the concept of a
right of privacy only to the article by Brandeis and Warren66 and in implying
that the Framers intended no such constitutionally protected right, Black is sub-
ject to challenge. The contention has been made that the protection of privacy
was at issue at the time the Constitution itself was adopted, and that the Con-
stitution would not have been ratified without an assurance that the privacy
of American citizens would be protected from arbitrary invasion by govern-
mental authorities." The Bill of Rights was adopted against the background
of so-called "writs of assistance," which authorized revenue officers to enter
suspected places and search for smuggled goods. Such writs were denounced
by James Otis in 1761 as an infringement of the Englishman's "right of House."6 "
Mr. Justice Story asserted in 1833 that the guarantees of free speech, press,
assembly, and religion were intended to secure the rights of "private sentiment"
and "private judgment."69 Francis Lieber asserted in 1853 that the first amend-
ment was intended to protect "freedom of communion," including "liberty of
silence" - the right not to speak - which was crucial to civil liberty, since no
one could enjoy liberty or exercise his "inextinguishable individuality" if "his
62 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) '(dissenting opinion).
63 Id. at 507.
64 Id. at 529.
65 Id. at 520.
66 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
67 113 CoNG. REc. S1386 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1967) (remarks of Senator Morse).
68 Ibid.




communion with his fellows is interrupted or submitted to surveillance."'
Private communication was protected by the federal mail statute of 18251
and by the judicial doctrine of privacy in unpublished letters, which provided
that the recipient or holder of a letter had no right to publish it.7" The legal
doctrines protecting privacy against unreasonable invasion were clear and
sophisticated, and the security of individuals and organizations in their right
to privacy generally received firm judicial enforcement even during the early
years of the Republic.7"
Black's false admonition that it is not the function of the Court to adapt
the Constitution to changing circumstances was, in part, the rationale that caused
the judiciary to fail to meet the challenge to privacy posed by such modem
devices as the telephone, eavesdropping and wiretapping equipment, and in-
stantaneous photography used in photographic surveillance. Because judicial
concepts were limited to property concepts and physical searches and seizures,
the courts failed to provide an effective tort or constitutional remedy when
nothing tangible was seized or there was no physical intrusion. This rigid
approach was illustrated in Olmstead v. United States,74 where the Court held
that the absence of a physical intrusion and the failure to take something tan-
gible put government wiretapping outside the rule of the fourth amendment.
Eavesdropping by a microphone from an adjoining room was held not for-
bidden by the fourth amendment, because there had been no trespass onto the
victim's property."
To assert that the fourth amendment protects privacy does not necessarily
"give it a niggardly interpretation,"7 6 as claimed by Black. The protection of
privacy does not mean that a public arrest or search and seizure is precluded
from protection. The fourth amendment may protect property and curtail
arbitrary governmental action as an aspect of, or in addition to, protecting the
right of privacy. An intrusion upon privacy, contrary to Black, involves more
than a hurting of feelings; it constitutes the denial of an individual right.
Brandeis and Warren, though presenting the right of privacy in the con-
text of tort law, regarded it as a fundamental human right, the core of all civil
liberties.7 Subsequently, Brandeis, as a member of the Supreme Court, invoked
the right of privacy in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United Statesi8
in arguing that the fourth amendment be applied to the tapping of telephones.
In his dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota,9 he anticipated the principle of family
70 LiEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT viii, 44-47, 71-75, 224 (1853).
The history of privacy in American law is traced in Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom:
Issues and Proposals for the 19 70's, Part II: Balancing and Conflicting Demands of Privacy,
Disclosure, and Surveillance, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1232 (1966).
71 Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 22, 4 Stat. 108.
72 Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297, 5 Am. Dec. 712 (La. Super. Ct. 1811).
73 Westin, supra note 70, at 1235.
74 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
75 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942).
76 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
77 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66.
78 277 U.S. 438, 475, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
79 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (dissenting opinion), where, in referring to the constitutionality
of a state law curtailing the expression of opposition to military conscription, Brandeis noted
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privacy upheld in Griswold by asserting that governmental authorities may not
prevent communication between members of a family. If a right of privacy
is recognized in tort law regarding action by private individuals, it logically
follows that such a right must be recognized where a public official or the
Government is the intruder.
As a living document, the Constitution must be interpreted within the
context of contemporary concepts and problems. Since privacy, rather than
property, is presently regarded as the "core of our civil liberties," the Court
could properly deduce a' general constitutional right of privacy from the Bill
of Rights, or from the ninth or fourteenth amendments."0 The analogy of recent
common-law tort cases"1 could establish constitutional protection for privacy
in marital relations.
Black, however, refused to recognize an independent, constitutional right
of privacy, upholding only those facets of privacy contained in specific consti-
tutional provisions. Conceivably, he might regard wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping as constituting constructive searches and seizures within the protection of
the fourth amendment, although this would contradict his contention that it
is not the function of the Court to adapt the Constitution to the needs of changing
times. He would also encounter difficulty in resolving York v. Story," where
a police officer privately distributed the photograph of a nude housewife taken
while she was detained and action was brought under the Civil Rights Act.8
In that case, Judge Hamley of the Ninth Circuit found the fourth amendment
inapplicable but held that the plaintiff's right of privacy, deduced from the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, was encroached.84 If Black holds
that there is no independent constitutional right of privacy as conceived by
Douglas, limits the application of the fourteenth amendment due process clause
to incorporating the enumerated rights, narrowly interprets the fourth amend-
ment, and denies the applicability of the ninth amendment, his inflexible posi-
tion would compel him to deny the plaintiff a remedy. Black's rationale would
tie the hands of the Court, because all denials of fundamental rights cannot
be fit into specific legal categories.
Black's contention that the ninth amendment is merely a limitation on
the federal government is contradicted by his claim that the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause had subsequently made the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states. In Adamson v. California8 5 he referred to the "first ten amend-
ments" as binding on the states, thus including the ninth, and urged extending
to all the people the complete protection of the Bill of Rights." In Griswold,
that, if broadly interpreted, the law could be construed to invade the privacy of the home,
involving conversation between parents and children. Id. at 335.
80 Dykstra, The Right Most Valued by Civilized Man, 6 UTAHr L. REv. 305 (1959);
Griswold, Right To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 216 (1960); Pound, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. Rms. L. Rev. 34 (1961); Note, 40 N.C.L.
REv. 788 (1962).
81 Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
82 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
83 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
84 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
85 332 U.S. 46 (1947) '(dissenting opinion).
86 Id. at 70-71.
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however, he claims the Court was not given the authority to construe the ninth
amendment, yet he presented no convincing historical or other reasons why the
ninth amendment should be construed differently from other constitutional
provisions.
Dean Pound seems to support Stewart's position that the ninth amendment
like the tenth, states a truism, that the power of the federal government is
limited to what is expressed and implied. Pound suggested that if the ninth
amendment is read with the tenth, those rights not expressly set forth are not
forever excluded but are left to be secured by the states or by the people
through formal constitutional amendment."7 However, granted that the ninth
amendment as originally proposed was coupled in one article with the tenth,
the fact remains that they were separated."8 The ninth resulted from the con-
cern expressed by Hamilton and other Federalists that if a Bill of Rights were
adopted enumerating specific rights, other rights not enumerated would be
precluded." At the time the Constitution was adopted, the notion of inherent
rights prevailed, however distasteful that doctrine is to Justice Black today. The
rights stated in the Constitution were considered natural rights and did not
exist merely because they were granted by governmental authority or stated
in a document."0 Apparently, the ninth amendment was intended to indicate
that, in construing the Constitution, the Court is not precluded from upholding
individual rights merely because they are not specified in the Constitution. Today
the ninth amendment can be reasonably construed to mean that the Framers
did not intend the Bill of Rights to codify the protection of individual liberty
under all circumstances, and that the Court, as its interpreter, is authorized
to fill in the gaps.
Black's antipathy toward the recognition of a constitutional right of
privacy, the use of the ninth amendment, or the application of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment stems from his opposition to natural-law
concepts, which he equates with subjective judicial judgment." For Black the
Constitution is the fundamental law, and the Court, exercising the power of
87 IThe Ninth Amendment is a solemn declaration that natural rights are not
a fixed category of reasonable human expectations in civilized society laid down
once for all in the several sections of the Constitution. Those not expressly set
forth are not forever excluded but are, if the Ninth Amendment is read with the
Tenth, left to be secured by the states or by the people of the whole land by consti-
tutional change, as was done, for example, by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pound,
Introduction to PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 38, at iv.
88 Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People"? 37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
787, 804-05 (1962).
89 Id. at 805-06.
90 PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMiENDMENT 1-2 (1955):
The Ninth Amendment announces and acknowledges in a single sentence that (1)
the individual, and not the State, is the source and basis of our social compact and
that sovereignty now resides and has always resided in the individual; (2) that
our Government exists through the surrender by the individual of a portion of his
naturally endowed and inherent rights; '(3) that everyone of the people of the
United States owns a residue of individual rights and liberties which have never
been, and which are never to be surrendered to the State, but which are still to be
recognized, protected and secured; and (4) that individual liberty and rights are
inherent, and that such rights are not derived from the Constitution, but belong to
the individual by natural endowment.




judicial review, must determine if a statute accords with the specific provisions
of this fundamental law. Since the Connecticut statute banning the use of
contraceptives by married persons did not violate any specific provision of the
Constitution, it cannot be deemed unconstitutional. The role of the judge is
to interpret only within the clearly marked policies of the Constitution."
But the difficulty with Black's approach is that even the so-called "specific"
constitutional provisions do not provide clear guidance for most problems. For
example, Black bases his "absolutist" interpretation of the first amendment
on what he regards as its plain meaning, although he admits that this coin-
cides with his policy beliefs." However, there is great uncertainty about the
meaning of "speech" and "abridge,"9 and history is by no means clear enough
to indicate that Black's interpretation accords with that of the Framers.95
Similarly, the eighth amendment provision regarding "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" may be broadly or narrowly applied in differing contexts.9" Clearly the
interpretation of the specific provisions of the Constitution must ultimately be
based on the judge's own subjective value judgments. Black admitted this by
conceding that "since words can have many meanings, interpretation obviously
may result in contraction or expansion of the original purpose of a constitutional
provision, thereby affecting policy."9 " The text of the Constitution is merely
the starting point of judicial review. "If a constitution purports to settle, in
detail and for all time, most of the issues that are likely to be the grist of the
political mill, it invites either abandonment or frequent amendment.""Ds
III. Denouement
Contrary to the dissenters' contention, the Court did not, in striking down
the Connecticut statute, sit as a supervisory agency over acts of legislative
bodies. This statute was enacted in 1873, when religious and moral attitudes
differed from those prevailing today99 and when medical knowledge of contra-
ceptive devices was limited."° ° Perhaps when the law was enacted it could have
been presumed to accomplish a sane and rational purpose, but this purpose
no longer exists. Elsewhere such statutes have been construed to meet changing
needs. The federal courts have construed the obscenity statutes, despite their
92 Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
93 Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 45-46
(1963); Cahn, Justice Black and the First Amendment Absolutes: A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 '(1962).
94 See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 88-98 (1962); LEVY, LEGACY OF Sup-
PRESSION (1962).
95 LEvy, op. cit. supra note 94.
96 E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
97 332 U.S. 46 '(1947) (dissenting opinion). Braden, The Search for Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 57 YALE LJ. 571 (1948), presents a critical analysis of the inconsistencies
in Black's position.
98 BicxEL, op. cit. supra note 94, at 105.
99 See Brief for Appellants, p. 24, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100 DICKENSON, TECHNIQUES OF CONTRACEPTION CONTROL (3d ed. 1950); Rock, THE
TIME HAS CoME '(1963); Dorsey, Changing Attitudes Toward Massachusetts Birth Control
Law, 271 NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 826 (1964); Stone, The Teaching of Contraception
in Medical Schools, 7 HUMAN FERTILITY 108 '(1942). For a collection of statements by
medical authorities see Brief for Appellants, pp. 40-47. On religious attitudes see id. at 49-56.
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plain wording,"' as not barring the importation of contraceptives for medical
purposes nor preventing their mailing or interstate shipment for such purposes." 2
The constitutional issue arose because the Connecticut courts failed to interpret
the statute to accord with changing needs,' and efforts to have the statute
amended by legislation had been frustrated by pressures from a religious group,
although one house of the legislature had supported change." 4 Clearly, the
Court could hardly be said to have overruled the majority will of the Con-
necticut electorate nor to have substituted its will for that of the legislature.
Although the Court has adopted the practice of deferring to the discretion
of the legislature on the justification or rationality of legislation, and it refrains
from substituting its own determination, such an approach is absurd in de-
termining the constitutionality of an eighty-three-year-old statute having no
contemporary relevance.
The problem with both the majority and dissenting opinions lies in trying
to develop or apply general or neutral principles." 5 To apply the dissentirig
approach of assuming a rational purpose that does not exist is unreal. However,
the principle of family privacy enunciated by the majority opinions conflicts
with the principle that the Court will refrain from examining the rational basis
of nondiscriminatory legislation and formulates a principle incapable of con-
sistent application.
Although in the vast majority of instances the Court may refrain from con-
sidering the rationality or justification of legislation, on certain occasions, where
the liberty and dignity of the individual is so arbitrarily infringed, judicial in-
tervention is required.' Where the state compels certain individuals who have
been convicted of a crime to be sterilized,l"r imposes a criminal conviction on
persons afflicted with narcotics addiction,0 s compels teachers to reveal all the
organizations in which they may have held membership,' or requires public
employees to swear that they did not belong to certain organizations,"0 the
Court has intervened. Even in economic matters the Court will invalidate action
101 62 Stat. 718 (1948), U.S.C. § 552 (1964); 62 Stat. 768 (1948), as amended,
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964); 62 Stat. 768 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1964).
102 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936); Davis v. United States,
62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933); Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Lee, 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930);
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
103 Connecticut v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 '(1964), rev'd, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Trubek v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 633, 165 A.2d 158 (1960), app. denied, 367 U.S. 907
(1961); Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959), app. denied sub noam.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942),
app. denied, 318 U.S. 44 '(1943); State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940).
Stone & Pilpul, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception, 22 N.C.L. REv. 212 (1944),
discusses court rulings in other jurisdictions indicating a more liberal interpretation of state
statutes and showing that these statutes were amended by judicial construction rather than
legislative action.
104 Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 322 (1960).
105 Cf. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUm. L. Rv. 1001 (1965);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
106 Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1, 44-92 (1965).
107 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
108 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
109 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
110 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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where the effect is a taking of property without just compensation.' Although
legislative authorities generally may be deemed to have acted rationally, occasions
arise where zealousness leads to enactments exceeding intended purposes, as has
happened with efforts to assure the loyalty of public employees or in regulating
subversion."' The Connecticut legislature, even in 1873, may have acted ex-
cessively in attempting to maintain public morality. The courts may interpret
a statute to limit its effect, but where judicial construction cannot apply, the
Court must then determine its constitutionality. A hard-core situation has then
arisen where individual liberty is restricted in a manner that offends the judge's
sense of injustice. Despite any self-imposed doctrine of judicial restraint, the
Court is compelled to intervene, because the governmental action is so patently
capricious and arbitrary.
The Connecticut statute, in banning the use of contraceptives by married
couples and forbidding physicians to prescribe such use, was precisely such a
situation. The only statute of its kind, it arbitrarily and capriciously interfered
with the intimacies of the marital relationship. Its irrationality was manifested in
that prophylactics were dispensed openly in drugstores throughout the state on
the assumption that such drugs and devices prevent disease. Even unmarried
persons could purchase and use them, while married couples were prevented
from obtaining professional assistance in family planning."' Although couples
with economic means could obtain professional assistance outside the state, the
lower-income groups, who were most in need of help, were effectively cut off
from aid. Adopted in 1873, the statute bore no relevance for the present. To
such a situation, previously established constitutional principles were inapplicable,
and only the narrowest formulation of new principles was required.
Although White's opinion was the most limiting, his placing of family
matters in a separate category from economic regulation is questionable. His
suggested approach was enunciated by Chief Justice Stone in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co.:"
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators." 5
This formulation, extended to regulation of moral and social behavior, would
111 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 '(1946); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (opinion by Holmes, J.); LOcKHART, KAmrSAR &
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613-41 (1964).
112 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
113 Brief for Appellants, pp. 70-71. Connecticut statutes also permit abortions in certain
instances and allow for sterilization. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-19 (Supp. 1966),
53-30 (1960). The ban on the use of contraceptives cannot be justified as aiding in the pre-
vention of the spread of venereal disease, because married couples must undergo a test before
they are given a marriage license while unmarried couples are never subject to such test. Brief
for Appellants, p. 71.
114 304 U.S. 144 "(1938).




enable the Court to declare the Connecticut statute unconstitutional through
application of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. While the Court
would continue to refrain from considering the rationality or wisdom of sub-
stantive legislation, leaving such matters to legislative determination, it would
not be precluded from striking down a statute that was patently arbitrary and
capricious, restricting individual liberty without any present conceivable justifica-
tion. There was no need to induce a constitutional right of privacy nor to
invoke the ninth amendment. Although judicial review was needed in Griswold,
the sweeping principles formulated by the majority opinions were unnecessary.
IV. Alternative Approaches
The amicus curiae brief for the American Civil Liberties Union invoked
the equal protection clause in arguing (1) that the Connecticut statute imposed
an arbitrary and unfair classification by prohibiting contraception by use of
"devices" while allowing contraception by other methods not employing "devices,"
for example, rhythm and withdrawal; (2) that the law discriminated against
women in that if they married, they were compelled to have children and could
not develop a career; and (3) that the law was discriminatory in punishing users
of the devices, but not the manufacturers or sellers.'16 But equal protection,
like due process, has seldom been used in recent years to strike down substantive
legislation," 7 although legislative apportionment" and racial discrimination" 9
are two major exceptions.
In a footnote the ACLU brief hinted that the Connecticut statute may
also be regarded as running afoul of the religious establishment clause of the first
amendment:
It may also be noted that prohibition against the use of contraceptive
devices, and allowance of contraception without any device, is a distinction
created and maintained by religious dogma, notably Orthodox Jewry and
Roman Catholicism. Guttmacher, Alan, M.D., Babies by Choice or by
Chance (Avon Books, 1961) pp. 79-86. A statute enacted pursuant to a
Puritan theology, which believed that idiocy, epilepsy, and damnation were
the fruits of sexual activity, and which is supported in this century largely by
other religious dogmas, breeches [sic] the wall of separation between church
and state, and violates the First Amendment. See, for example, Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963). Undoubtedly the state can legislate in the field of morals,
but it cannot seek to impose on all its diverse citizenry a morality which
is preached and pursued only in the dogma of some religions.'"
Stewart, in a footnote to his dissenting opinion, replied to this argument:
To be sure, the injunction contained in the Connecticut statute co-
116 Amicus Curiae Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, pp. 15-16.
117 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
118 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
119 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120 Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, p. 17 n.12. The asser-
tion that Orthodox Judaism is unalterably opposed to birth control is not quite correct. See
Brief for Appellants, p. 53.
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incides with the doctrine of certain religious faiths. But if that were enough
to invalidate a law under the provisions of the First Amendment relating
to religion, then most criminal laws would be invalidated. See, e.g., the
Ten Commandments. The Bible, Exodus 20:2-17 (King James) .
21
Stewart's argument appears somewhat weak. Most criminal statutes have
the secular purpose of maintaining peace and order or social well-being, and
the Court has held that even though a statute may have been enacted as part
of a religious establishment and its continued enforcement may serve religious
needs, it will be upheld if deemed to serve a valid secular purpose.122 The con-
troversy arises only with respect to legislation that proscribes individual moral
behavior without relevance to public peace and well-being, because such laws
are, in effect, expressions of religious dogma.us In most instances the Court has
strained to find a secular purpose to uphold the constitutionality of the statute,
12
,
but this would be very difficult with the Connecticut statute, which served no
conceivable secular purpose.125 Thus, it could be reasonably argued that the
Connecticut statute breached the wall of separation between church and state
by using state authority to impose the practices of certain religious groups. The
Court in this instance would not be required to go beyond the wording of the
statute and psychoanalyze the legislature,"' because it would not examine the
intent or motives of the lawmakers, but only the effect of the statute. Perhaps
the justices refused to take this approach because it would have involved them
in matters of an extremely sensitive nature, namely, the constitutionality of legis-
lation involving morals, particularly abortion." r
V. The General Implications of Griswold
The significance of this decision may be somewhat clouded by the lack of a
real majority opinion, for the use of the ninth amendment breaks new ground
in the development of constitutional law. The opinions indicate that a majority
of the Court limits the application of the due process clause to the absorption, if
not total incorporation, of the Bill of Rights, which now encompasses only the
first eight amendments. The Court is not, however, precluded from protecting
rights that have not been specified in those eight amendments.
The decision indicates a particular concern by the Court for legislation and
government action affecting the family relationship. The protection of the family
within the context of a right of privacy is a position significantly in accordance
with article twelve of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted
121 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529 n.2 (1965).
122 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys From
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 '(1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
123 DEVLIN, ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1961); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963); Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the
Model Penal Code, 63 CoLum. L. Rrv. 669 (1963).
124 E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
125 Cogley, Controversy in Connecticut, 67 COMMONWEAL 657 (1958).
126 LOCKHART, KAmISAR & CHOPER, op. cit. supra note 111, at 1196.
127 See generally BicKEL, op. cit. supra note 94, at 143-56.
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by the General Assembly of the United Nations." Griswold is in line with
the precedents of Meyer v. Nebraska,'2 9 holding that a state may not forbid the
schooling of a child in a foreign language; Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"3 0 holding
that a state may not compel a child to attend a public school and not a private
or parochial school; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,'' holding
that a child may not be compelled to salute the flag in a public school classroom;
Engel v. Vitale,"3 2 holding that the state may not prescribe prayers for utterance
in a classroom; School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,"'5 holding that
the state may not require the reading of the Bible or the saying of prayers in a
classroom; and Skinner v. Oklahoma,"3 4 holding that the state may not compel
the sterilization of persons convicted of a crime. Although these cases may have
been decided under the due process clause, the equal protection clause, or the
first amendment, they are also embodied within the right of privacy and the
protection of the family. But, as indicated in Griswold, the state could regulate
family relations, where reasonably necessary to further an overriding state interest.
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 5 the Court upheld compulsory vaccination,
and in Prince v. Massachusetts.6 a child-labor law was unheld, even though
the free exercise of religion was involved. As the Court stated in Prince:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in
recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest,
as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of religion nor
rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general
interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified
merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course
of conduct on religion or conscience. . . . It is sufficient to show what
indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power
for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and
religious conviction.13 7 (Citations omitted.)
In scrutinizing a given statute or state action, the Court has the alternative
of stressing the primacy of the family relationship, as expressed in the Meyer-
Pierce-Skinner-Griswold precedents, and calling upon the state to adopt less
128 "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attack." Analyzed in RorNsoN, THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 117-18 (1958).
129 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
130 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
131 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
132 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
133 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
134 316 U.S. 535 (1943).
135 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
136 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
137 Id. at 166-67.
[June 1967]
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT
objectionable means to achieve its purpose; or it may follow the Jacobson-Prince
approach and focus on the need for acting in the public interest and subordinate
the privacy of the family relationship. The approach selected will depend on
the interests to be protected, the availability of alternatives, and the extent of
interference with the family relationship."' But since the stability of the family
so directly affects the public interest and involves considerable social-science
expertise, the Court will intervene only where the nature of state infringement
is arbitrary, is based on race, or constitutes a religious establishment.
Griswold indicates judicial sensitivity to state efforts to regulate family size.
If government authorities may not forbid the use of drugs and devices by
married couples, a total prohibition upon the sale or distribution of such drugs
may be of questionable validity. Following the decision, New York's statute was
amended to eliminate such a total prohibition and to permit contraceptives to
be dispensed by prescription. 9 On the very day after the decision in Griswold,
the Corporation Counsel for the City Council of Chicago declared that the
decision provided ample legal basis for approving the city's contract to purchase
contraceptive supplies for the board of health. 40 Several states have repealed
or amended their birth control laws, and thirty-nine states are "active in providing
birth control information and/or services."'
4
Currently, the issue is the extent to which the Government may act to
promote birth control. Although there is dicta in Goldberg's opinion that the
state may not limit family size,'42 this does not preclude federal or local authorities
from advising public-assistance recipients and others about the use of birth
control drugs and devices or in making contraceptive devices available. The
contention has been made that Griswold confers a constitutional right on married
couples to determine family size, and governmental authorities are thus obligated
to provide couples having limited incomes with the means for exercising this
right. 43 The fear has been expressed that a welfare recipient, because of his
dependence on welfare officials, would inevitably be coerced, even though the
policy was to distribute the means and information for birth control on a
voluntary basis.' Proper administration, however, could assure that the program
would be voluntary. Generally, the underlying policy has been to provide birth
control assistance only to those women who desire it; since most mothers of low-
income families desire to limit the size of their families, the problem of forcing
compliance does not really exist.'45 There have, however, been instances where
138 Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. Rav.
254 (1964). Also suggestive of the stress on public interest is Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1873).
139 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1142.
140 Chicago Sun Times, June 9, 1965.
141 American Civil Liberties Union, Feature Press Service (Feb. 14, 1966).
142 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (concurring opinion):
[If upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary
birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law re-
quiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my view, how-
ever, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy
which are constitutionally protected.
143 111 CONG. REc. 23427 '(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965) (sermon by Archbishop O'Boyle).
144 Ibid.
145 New Republic, Sept. 25, 1965, p. 5; Greene, Federal Birth Control: Progress Without
Policy, Reporter, Nov. 18, 1965, p. 35.
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attempts were made to deny welfare assistance to mothers having illegitimate
children or to impose penal sanctions on them.'" If the underlying policy is to
discourage premarital or extramarital relations, equal-protection rights may be
infringed, since only those women who become pregnant and have children
are punished.
Griswold may well begin a new era of constitutional protection for the
right of privacy. For the first time, the Court specifically ruled that the right to
privacy had been violated by nonphysical means.'47 Previously the Court had
recognized the right of privacy within the context of the fourth amendment. In
Boyd v. United States, 48 the Court upset a statute requiring production of per-
sonal papers and providing that facts would be taken as confessed upon a
failure to produce the required papers. The Court there stressed that it was
"not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers, that con-
stituted the essence of the offense"; but rather, the "invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property .... ."'9 However,
absent a physical penetration or the taking of property, the Court has failed
to extend the protection of the fourth amendment to the tapping of telephones
and eavesdropping. Griswold, along with other decisions indicating the recog-
nition of a constitutional right of privacy, may mean an extension of the applica-
tion of the fourth amendment to wiretapping and eavesdropping or the invoca-
tion of a constitutional right of privacy to these situations. 5 However, the
Court has failed to apply a right of privacy to exclude evidence obtained
through the use of an informer present in the defendant's hotel suite, 5 ' where
he buys narcotics at his home,'52 or uses a tape recorder to record a confidential
conversation.' 5'
The first amendment has also served as a ground for enforcing the in-
dividual's right of privacy. Under that amendment's aegis, the Court had previ-
ously recognized a right to anonymity in the dissemination of ideas and in be-
longing to organizations or associations.' The Court has also recognized the
right of privacy in the sense of the right of the individual to remain silent. 5
The right of privacy is premised on the assumption that, although man
is a social animal, he seeks to protect a certain area of his life from scrutiny and
control. By retaining this private area the individual is enabled to develop
his personality through the opportunity for emotional release and the satisfaction
of other physical and psychological needs. He is freed from the restraints of
146 Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245, 1247 (1965).
147 Rodgers, A New Era for Privacy, 43 N.D.L. Rv. 253 (1967).
148 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
149 Id. at 630.
150 Statement attributed to Thomas Emerson, counsel for appellants in Griswold. N.Y.
Times, June 15, 1965, p. 25, cols. 2, 3; LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (Supp. 1965, at 114).
151 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 1966).
152 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
153 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
154 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
155 Watldns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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social conformity and able to exercise his creativity. 56 But privacy cannot be
tolerated merely as a selfish right. The complexity of modern society, resulting
in the interaction of individuals and groups and requiring social planning, limits
the area of privacy. As with the common-law tort,157 the, constitutional right of
privacy must balance individual rights with the public interest.
The right of privacy has received extensive public attention as a result of
the exposures by congressional investigations into the investigative techniques
of governmental agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, the Narcotics
Bureau, and the Food and Drug Administration.'Y Congressional investigations
have also revealed surveillance of government employees by testing and ques-
tionnaires regarding intimate aspects of their lives.'59 The proposal for a data-
control center to contain information on almost every American has caused
concern over whether such information could be used to invade individual
privacy. 6" Psychological testing, particularly when undertaken by government
authorities, may infringe the constitutional right of privacy.'
Griswold is particularly applicable with regard to the invasion of privacy
in the administration of public assistance. In dispensing assistance, welfare
officials often require recipients to reveal intimate details of their personal and
family life - an infringement of the primacy of the family relationship. The
granting of assistance has been conditioned on adherence to prescribed moral
standards, and mothers have been threatened with the denial of the custody
of their children. 2 Living quarters have been subjected to arbitrary checking.163
The financial means test and the administration of the welfare programs make
the individual's privacy peculiarly vulnerable to infringement. The problem be-
comes more complex as welfare programs are expanded beyond the efficient
dispensation of aid to encompass an effort to eliminate the causes of poverty.'64
156 The role and function of privacy is discussed and analyzed in Westin, Science, Privacy
and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, Part I-The Current Impact of Sur-
veillance on Privacy, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1003 (1966); Symposium -Privacy, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 251 (1966). The term "breathing space," is derived Tfrom Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
157 Note, Right of Privacy, 11 N.Y.L.F. 120 (1965).
158 Hearings on Invasions of Privacy (Government Agencies) Before Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., pts. 2, 3 (1965). The Internal Revenue Service has actually trained agents to pick
locks. 113 CONG. REc. S1387 '(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1967) (remarks of Senator Morse).
159 Hearings on Psychological Testing Procedures and the Rights of Federal Employees
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" by the
Federal Government Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Creech,
The Privacy of Government Employees, 31 LAw & CONTaMP. PROB. 413 (1966).
160 Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 342 (1966); A Government Watch on 200
Million Americans? U.S. News & World Report, May 16, 1966, p. 56; 112 CONG. RmEc. 27521
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1966).
161 Mirel, The Limits of Governmental Inquiry Into the Private Lives of Government
Employees, 46 B.U.L. Rav. 1 (1966); Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research,
65 COLUm. L. REv. 1184 (1965).
162 Reich, supra note 146.
163 Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347
(1963).
164 Handier & Rosenhein, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile juttice, 31
LAw & CONTaMP. PRoB. 377 (1966).
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The price for rehabilitating the welfare recipient results in greater involvement
by public officials in the recipient's personal life.
The nature of the relationship between the recipient and the agency re-
quires protection from arbitrary action so the dignity of the individual may
be maintained. Courts, however, have been reluctant to intervene in the dis-
pensation of welfare, deferring to administrative discretion.'65 One area where
judicial intervention may be suitable is in the practice of conducting mass pre-
dawn inspections of the homes of welfare recipients to determine the presence
of "absent parents" or unauthorized males.'6 6 Although the Court has refused
to apply the fourth amendment to the enforcement of administrative regula-
tions, 6 ' the right of privacy as enunciated in Griswold would appear to protect
the recipient from such an infringement. To claim that the recipient consents
to the inspection by letting the social worker enter is illusory, since a refusal to
admit may result in a denial of welfare benefits. In the relationship between
recipient and official, the former is in a peculiarly subordinate position. 6 '
VI. Implications for Moral Legislation
The Connecticut statute banning married couples from using drugs or de-
vices to prevent conception falls within the category of moral legislation, for it
seeks to regulate aspects of individual behavior that do not affect social peace
and well-being.'69 Other instances of such moral legislation include prohibitions
against private fornication, homosexuality, adultery, and possibly, euthanasia."
Debated in Britain in relation to the Wolfendon Commission Report proposing
to legalize homosexuality,' 7' and in the United States in relation to the adoption
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,"7 2 the issue is the extent to
which legal sanction should be used to regulate such behavior. While the legal
prohibition of open prostitution, fornication, and homosexuality may be justified
as curtailing a public nuisance and as limiting the spread of venereal disease,
it is questionable whether the law should interfere where two adult individuals
165 Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 242 Cal. App. 2d 665, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
166 Comment, 44 J. URBAN LAW 119 (1966).
167 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
'(1959).
168 Comment, supra note 166. Perhaps the protection of privacy vis-a-vis government
agencies could be best assured through the institution of the Ombudsman, which was adopted
in Sweden to check upon arbitrary official actions. Citizens with specific grievances may turn
to the Ombudsman, a specially appointed official, to inquire into allegations of bureaucratic
misbehavior. The institution has also been adopted in the British Isles and New Zealand
and has been proposed in Congress. Where resort to the judiciary would be too cumbersome,
the Ombudsman would constitute an effective tool for the protection of the individual. An-
derson, The Ombudsman Abroad, 113 CONG. REc. A238 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1967).
169 Brief for Appellants, p. 31, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
170 HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1962); Schwartz, supra note 123. WILLIAMS,
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1956), would include mercy killing in
this category; but Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy Killing'
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958), takes a different position.
171 Devlin, Mill on Liberty in Morals, 32 U. Ci. L. RE V. 215 (1965); Devlin, Law,
Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. Rv. 635 '(1962); Hughes, Morals and the Criminal
Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962).
172 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment, apps. A-E (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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voluntarily agree to engage in private heterosexual or homosexual relations.
Public policy considerations have been advanced on this issue, but aside from
considering the desirability of such laws, a constitutional question is involved." 3
Although the Court did not face this issue in Griswold, the question was
raised in the appellants' brief and the oral arguments. 74 Arguing that the Court
cannot take the position that the simple claim of a moral aid by the legislature
satisfied the requirement of due process since that would immunize all legislation
from the mandate of the due process clause, the appellants urged:
We submit that the standard in such cases should at least be that '(1)
the moral practices regulated by the statute must be objectively related to
the public welfare, or (2) in the event no such relationship can be demon-
strated, the regulation must conform to the predominant view of morality
prevailing in the community. In other words, if the legislature cannot
establish that the law promotes the public welfare in a material sense, it
cannot enforce the morality of a minority group in the community upon
other members of the community 75
Stewart, referring to this argument, stated that "it is not the function of this
Court to decide cases on the basis of community standards."'176
Although appellants urged that the legislature cannot enforce the morality
of a minority group in the community, they did not explain why it may enforce
the morality of the majority assuming the Connecticut birth control law did
reflect the will of the majority. To compel adherence to a set moral pattern does
not accord with the notions of a free society nor with notions of privacy. Freedom
for moral experimentation should be encouraged. Furthermore, the brief does not
indicate what the predominant moral view is, although it does establish, by
reference to public opinion surveys and the views of medical authorities, that
the majority view does not advocate forbidding the use of contraceptives. Never-
theless, there is no clear indication of what constitutes the predominant opinion
on a particular moral issue and how it should be determined. The difficulties in
making such a determination seem to preclude the application of this approach.
In supporting their standard, the appellants quoted Harlan's dissent in Poe
that "the mere assertion that the action of the State finds justification in the
controversial realm of morals cannot justify alone any and every restriction
it imposes."'" But Harlan went on to state:
Yet the very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-
being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the
moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line .between
173 The policy issues may indeed become intertwined with the constitutional issues. The
arguments against the legal regulation of private consensual behavior include the difficulty
of enforcement, the possibility that enforcement may be arbitrary, the likelihood of black-
mail, the combining of what should be moral regulations with legal sanction, and the invasion
of privacy. See PLOSCOWE, SEx AND Tim LAW (rev. ed. 1962).
174 Brief for Appellants, pp. 36-39. The reference to the oral argument is made in
Stewart's dissenting opinion. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965).
175 Brief for Appellants, p. 37.
176 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
177 Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961).
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public behavior and that which is purely consensual or solitary would be to
withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with which every
society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal. The laws regarding
marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the
legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up, as
well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices
which express the negative of the proposition, confine sexuality to lawful
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.'
78
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily
an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institu-
tion which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every
age it has fostered and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts
its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who
may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage
and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the
criminal law the details of that intimacy.
In sum, even though the State has determined that the use of con-
traceptives is as iniquitous as any act of extra-marital sexual immorality,
the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart
of marital privacy, requiring husband and wife to render account before
a criminal tribunal of their uses of that intimacy, is surely a very different
thing indeed from punishing those who establish intimacies which the law
has always forbidden and which can have no claim to social protection.7 9
(Emphasis added.)
Harlan's position is inapplicable to contemporary American society. Al-
though the "moral soundness of the people" may be a legitimate legislative con-
cern in a society where religious homogeneity provides a consensus on what is
proper moral behavior, it is hardly legitimate in a pluralistic society where over
half the population has engaged in nonmarital sexual relations.' Contrary to
Harlan, the common law'.' and the legal systems of other civilized societies82
do distinguish between public and private morality. The United States is among
a minority of nations prohibiting private homosexual relationships between con-
178 Id. at 545-46.
179 Id. at 553.
180 Eighty-five percent of the male population have had premarital intercourse while 30%
to 45% have had extramarital relations and 70% have had relations with prostitutes. Thirty-
seven percent have had homosexual relations. KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BE-
HAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948). For criticism of the implications of this survey, cf.
Schwartz, Book Review, 97 U. PA. L. RE-v. 914 (1948). Cf. KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1952). Another survey revealing promiscuity
is Reiss, Social Class and Premarital Sexual Permissiveness, 30 Am. SociAL REv. 347 (1965).
181 PLOScOwE, op. cit. supra note 173, at 131.
182 Ploscowe, Report to the Hague: Suggested Revisions of Penal Laws Relating to Sex
Crimes and Crimes Against the Family, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 425 (1965), noting that in 1964
at the Association Internationale de Droit Pinal, comprised of six hundred delegates from
fifty countries, there was unanimous agreement that a single act of sexual intercourse between
persons above the age of consent as fixed by the penal law should not be a crime. There was
also agreement that the crime of adultery should be eliminated from the penal code. The
conference also opposed the prohibition of the dissemination of birth control information and




senting adults.""3 The tendency in a number of American jurisdictions has been
to adopt or construe statutes regulating sexual behavior as not applying to adult
consensual relationships.8 4
The right of privacy should not be limited to the marital relationsFip.
Freedom is premised on the notion that the individual should be allowed to
live as he chooses, to the extent that he does not infringe the rights of others.
The state may properly inflict punishment only when such infringement occurs
and regulation will result in the greatest happiness for the greatest number."a
Although in contemporary society the area of activity in which the individual
may be free from state regulation is considerably more limited than in the nine-
teenth century, the right of privacy and the upholding of personal rights assume
such areas remain. In a pluralistic society one such area of personal freedom is
in the realm of morals. The individual may properly be permitted to determine
his own morality, including his sexual behavior, to the extent that he does not
disturb the public peace or adversely affect the social well-being. A pluralistic
society is premised on the notion that it is not the function of the state to pre-
scribe the individual's moral behavior, and to the extent that it so engages, it
impinges upon the right of privacy.
In most instances the constitutional issue will not arise, as the statute is
likely to be construed as not applying to private, consensual activity; and where
such laws exist, they are rarely enforced.8 The constitutional issue will arise
from the rare, hard-core invasion of individual liberty of the kind that occurred
in Griswold. Conceivably, one such area may involve the application of the Mann
Act,1 7 involving the transportation of women across state lines for immoral
purposes. The Supreme Court has held the law applicable even where an adult




In Griswold v. Connecticut the Court, in deciding the constitutionality of
an extraordinary statute, for the first time asserted an independent constitutional
right of privacy derived from the enumerated rights of the first eight amend-
ments, the ninth amendment, or the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment - depending upon which opinion is selected - to protect family and
marital relations. " The decision may be limited only to the facts of the par-
183 Chicago Daily News, Aug. 18, 1966. The other nations are Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. In the United States homo-
sexuality is illegal in forty-nine states, with Illinois the sole exception.
184 Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960); Note,
Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YA.LE L.J.
623 (1961).
185 BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).
HART, Op. cit. supra note 170; MILL, ON LIBERTY (1849).
186 See note 184 supra.
187 62 Stat. 812 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1964).
188 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
189 Rodgers, supra note 147, at 255, aptly summarizes the constitutional status of the
right of privacy:
It should be obvious that the specific protections contained in the Bill of Rights
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ticulkr case, or it may serve as a precedent to protect personal rights in a broad
range of situations. The Griswold principles are virgin and subject to semination;
the manner in which the seeds will germinate will depend upon judicial in-
clination.
were designed to protect the privacy of the individual from those forms of invasion
that were most prevalent before the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Viewed at this
angle, one might agree that the founders had a broader purpose in mind than those
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In addition, one might stretch a point
and suggest that the Ninth Amendment reflects this inasmuch as it provides that
"the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." In another sense it might be argued
that in a society based on the concept of limited government, "all enumerated rights
in the Constitution can be described as contributing to the right of privacy, if by the
term is meant the integrity and freedom of the individual person and personalty."
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